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The doctrine of informed consent dictates that a physician has 
a legal duty to disclose to a patient sufficient information regard-
ing the inherent risks and benefits of a proposed course of 
treatment, and alternatives to the proposed treatment so the 
patient can intelligently exercise his or her judgment about 
whether to undergo that treatment. The development of the law 
regarding informed consent both nationally and in Hawaii is 
examined along with the current status of the law and its potential 
impact on physician behavior and health care delivery in Hawaii. 
When a physician fails to obtain informed consent from a patient 
before proceeding with treatment, he or she has failed to practice 
up to the professional standard of conduct expected of physi-
cians and can be sued under a theory of negligence. The basic 
elements of a cause of action based on negligence are: 1) a duty 
or obligation recognized by the law, 2) a breach of that duty, 3) 
a legally recognized causal connection between the conduct and 
the injury, and 4) actualloss or damage to another. Element four, 
actual loss or damage, is an essential part of a plaintiffs case, 
and without that element, there is no cause of action.' 
National Case Law 
Schloendorffv. Society of New York HospitaP is the initial case 
involving the physician's requirement to obtain informed con-
sent. It was in that case that Justice Cardozo said, "Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who 
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an 
assault."2 The court made no distinction between informed 
consent and consent. Forty-three years later, Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Jr University Board of Trustees, established the legal 
duty of a physician to provide a "full disclosure of facts neces-
sary to an informed consent."3 The Salgo court said physicians 
had a duty to disclose, but allowed the physician to use his or her 
best discretion as to what disclosure was necessary for informed 
consent. The court said: 
Each patient presents a separate problem ... the patient's 
mental and emotional condition is important and in certain 
cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of 
risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed 
consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an 
informed consent. 3 
Several years later in Natanson v. Kline, 4 the court adopted the 
Sal go standard and held that the decision as to what to disclose 
was primarily a medical judgment; therefore, the duty was 
limited to disclosures that a reasonable physician would make in 
similar circumstances. The court concluded that under this 
professional standard "the patient is properly protected by the 
medical profession's own recognition of its obligations to main-
tain its standards."4 
Canterbury v. Spence,5 a federal court decision, changed the 
-
professional standard rule and developed a patient-centered 
standard of disclosure. The Canterbury court decided that "re-
spect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular 
therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than 
one which physicians may or may not impose upon them-
selves."5 The court, however, recognizing that a physician 
would be hard-pressed to know exactly what each-and-every 
patient might deem relevant in a given situation, adopted what 
has come to be known as the "objective patient standard," based 
on "the average reasonable patient ... with due regard for the 
patient's informational needs and with suitable leeway for the 
physician's situation."5 
The court also acknowledged several exceptions to the disclo-
sure requirement, including risks inherent in any procedure 
(such as infection), hazards that the patient is already aware of, 
and emergencies where there is no time to obtain consent and 
waiting for consent would greatly endanger the patient.5 In 
addition, the Canterbury court recognized the "therapeutic 
privilege" exception to disclosure of risk information. Accord-
ing to the Canterbury court this privilege occurs when a patient 
might become "so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure as 
to foreclose a rational decision, or complicate or hinder the 
treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the 
patient."5 
In keeping with the negligence theory, the Canterbury court 
determined that, in addition to breach of duty, there must also be 
evidence of a causal connection between the breach and the 
injury, and that without injury or harm there was no actionable 
negligence unless the disclosure of risk information would have 
led the patient to opt for a different treatment, the failure to 
provide that information, while a breach of duty, is not sufficient 
for a cause of action under negligence theory. This should be 
objectively determined, ie, "what a prudent person in the patient's 
position would have decided if suitably informed of all perils 
bearing significance."5 
In summary, Salgo, Natanson, and Canterbury established 
failure to provide informed consent as negligence, ie, malprac-
tice. Salgo and Natanson said that the decision as to what to 
disclose was a professional decision, while Canterbury said it 
was to be based on what the patient would view as important. 
While Salgo and Natanson did not need to address the issue, 
Canterbury said that causation, ie, whether the information 
would have changed a decision, was to be based on an objective 
"prudent patient" standard. 
The court's hesitancy to trust the accuracy of the plaintiffs 
memory and judgment is well supported by empirical studies. 
Research demonstrates that people do not accurately remember 
even their own predictions, and therefore, end up exaggerating 
what they thought they knew at a previous time. "This research 
does not imply that hindsight is a knowing misrepresentation of 
fact, for individuals will be truthful in their hindsight recall. The 
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hindsight bias arises from cognitive limitations on people's 
ability to recall past perspectives accurately."6 A recent study 
done in Hawaii confirmed the unreliability of patients' memo-
ries. Ninety percent of 144 patients who had been informed of 
the risk of death from gallbladder surgery were able to correctly 
recall that warning prior to surgery. However, only three weeks 
after surgery 54% of those who correctly remembered before 
surgery stated that they had not been told that death was a 
potential risk. 7 
Hawaii Law 
In Hawaii, both statute and common law make failure to obtain 
informed consent a medical tort. 
In 1970, two years before the landmark Canterbury decision, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Nishi v. Hartwell, 8 established its 
position on the doctrine of informed consent. The court, citing 
the Salgo decision, stated: 
The doctrine of informed consent imposes upon a physician 
a duty to disclose to his patient all relevant information 
concerning a proposed treatment, including the collateral 
hazards attendant thereto, so that the patient's consent to the 
treatment would be an intelligent one based on complete 
information ... However, the doctrine recognizes that the 
primary duty of a physician is to do what is best for his 
patient and that a physician may withhold disclosure of 
information regarding any untoward consequences of treat-
ment where full disclosure will be detrimental to the patient's 
total care and best interest. 8 
The court held that the standard to be used in determining 
whether adequate disclosure had been made was a professional 
standard, ie, "by reference to relevant medical standards. "8 This 
meant the plaintiff had to prove with expert medical testimony 
that the relevant medical standard had not been met. 
In 1976, in response to what was perceived as a medical 
malpractice crisis, the Hawaii legislature, to lend some potential 
protection to the physician, enacted legislation that attempted to 
develop standards for informed consent. The act stated: "The 
standards established by the board shall be prima facie evidence 
of the standards of care required but may be rebutted by either 
party. "9 The legislation also codified the common law exception 
to risk disclosure in the case of emergency treatment. The law 
did not directly address the standard of disclosure or the standard 
of causation. 
In 1983 the legislature amended the statute to more clearly 
identify the scope of the disclosure. The statute stated: 
If the standards established by the Board of Medical Examin-
ers include provisions which are designed to reasonably 
inform a patient, or a patient's guardian, of: 
1) The condition being treated; 
2) The nature and character of the proposed treatment or 
surgical procedure; 
3) The anticipated results; 
4) The recognized possible alternative forms of treatment; 
and 
5) The recognized serious possible risks, complications 
and anticipated benefits involved in the treatment or surgical 
· procedure, and in the recognized possible alternative 
forms of treatment, including nontreatment, then the standards 
shall be admissible as evidence of the standard of care 
required of the health care providers. 10 
Again, the legislative language was ambiguous as to whether 
the standard of disclosure was patient centered or professional. 
In 1985, in Leyson v. Steuermann, 11 the Intermediate Court of 
-
Appeals examined the doctrine of informed consent. The Ley son 
court, noting ambiguity in the language of Nishi and HRS 
§671(3) (1976), did not address the standard of disclosure. The 
court did reaffirm, however, the previously discussed excep-
tions to the informed consent doctrine. 
Applying the facts of the case to its interpretation of the law, 
the Leyson court described the tort of negligent failure to 
disclose risk information as: 
1) duty to disclose ... risks ... 2) breach ... (of the] duty; 3) 
injury; and 4) breach of duty was a cause of injury in that: 
a) (the] treatment was a substantial factor in bringing about 
[the] injury and b) [the patient], acting rationally and rea-
sonably, would not have undergone the treatment had he 
been informed of the risk of the harm that in fact occurred; 
and 5) no other cause is a superseding cause. 11 
By defining element4 bin terms of the specific patient "acting 
rationally and reasonably," the court broke with previous courts 
by blending objective and subjective aspects of a patient ori-
ented standard of causation: 
[W]e opt for the application of a modified objective stan-
dard that determines the question [of causation] from the 
viewpoint of the actual patient acting rationally and reason-
ably _II 
This new "modified objective" standard examined causation 
from the view of the "actual patient [subjective component] 
acting rationally and reasonably [objective component]."11 
In Mroczkowski v. Straub Clinic & Hospital, Inc, 12 the Inter-
mediate Court of Appeals then held that before a plaintiff can 
argue that the duty to disclose a risk was negligently performed, 
he or she must prove that the harm complained about was a 
probable risk of the operation and that the defendant knew or 
should have known of that fact. The risks to be disclosed were 
"all recognized serious possible risks of harm and complications 
that the physician knew or should have known of, plus other 
information."12 
Once again the court declined to address whether the question 
of seriousness of the risk was to be "answered from the point of 
view of the patient, the physician, or otherwise."12 
Keomaka v. Zakaib 13 is the most recent decision by the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals regarding the doctrine of in-
formed consent. It then reaffirmed the need for causality to be 
established vis-a-vis both the treatment rendered and the nondis-
closure of the risk, ie, that the injury was caused by the treatment 
and that if the risk had been disclosed the patient would not have 
undergone the treatment. The court also addressed the question 
of whether a patient can be contributorily (or more correctly 
comparatively) negligent when a physician attempts to obtain 
informed consent. This issue could turn out to be the most 
important aspect of Keomaka. 
The court held, in firm and unequivocal language, that "con-
tributory negligence has no place in an action for failure to obtain 
informed consent."13 The court stated the argument that 
Keomaka's failure to read the informed consent form was 
contributory negligence was without merit, and the duty to 
inform rests with the physician: 
[B]ecause of the superior knowledge of the doctor with his 
expertise in medical matters and the generally limited 
ability of the patient to ascertain the existence of certain 
risks and dangers that inhere in certain medical treatments, 
it would be unfair and illogical to impose on the patient the 
duty of inquiry or other affirmative duty with respect to 
informed consent. 13 
The court specifically stated that the mere signing of a printed 
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consent form (even one that said that the doctor had discussed all 
risks and alternatives) would not fulfill the physician's duty and 
"is not a substitute for the required disclosure by the physi-
cian."13 
The court did not discuss whether or not the physician's duty 
could be carried out through affirmative acts of other hospital 
personnel such as nurses or pharmacists, and if so, what duty the 
physician had to make sure that the information had been 
understood by the patient. This point is of more than academic 
interest because many hospitals now use nurses and pharmacists 
to provide patient education regarding disease and treatment. 
Summarizing Hawaii law: Failure to provide informed con-
sent is a tort, with the parameters of the tort defined in statutory 
and common law. Treatments, alternatives to treatment, and all 
recognized serious possible risks are to be disclosed. While 
ambiguous, it seems that a professional standard is to be used to 
decide what to disclose. A modified objective standard (the 
actual patient acting rationally and reasonably) is to be used to 
determine if the disclosure would have changed the patient's 
decision. The plaintiff must prove both that a risk was not 
disclosed and that if it had been disclosed, the patient, acting 
rationally and reasonably, would not have undergone the treat-
ment. Finally, in Hawaii the patient cannot be contributorily 
negligent by failing to ask questions, by signing a form that he 
or she has not read, or any other act of commission or omission 
related to the informed consent process. 
Discussion 
Current Hawaii law, pointing to the importance of protecting 
patient autonomy, requires physicians to obtain informed con-
sent from their patients before proceeding with treatment. It is 
commendable and appropriate that Hawaii's legislature and 
courts are interested in protecting patients. However, some of 
their assumptions about the role of informed consent in protect-
ing a patient's autonomy (and even what autonomy is) are open 
to examination. The autonomy rationale for informed consent 
argues that all human beings have a right to make their own 
decisions, and that any limitation on the information provided to 
patients is an affront and infringement on that right. Yet the 
Hawaii courts ignore at least two significant realities with their 
rulings: 
First is the relationship between autonomy and responsibility. 
Hawaii law holds that the patient has no responsibility relating 
to the process of informed consent. Ironically, the court bases 
this idea of no responsibility on the very thing that it seems to 
question: The professional expertise and judgment of the physi-
cian. The court feels that the physician's expertise vis-a-vis the 
patient places all responsibility for initiating, maintaining, and 
structuring informed consent on the doctor. This appears con-
trary to the idea that the patient is an autonomous individual, for 
if that were so, he or she would have some responsibility for the 
choices made, ie, to sign or not sign a form indicating that 
something had happened when in fact it had not. More impor-
tant, the no responsibility standard negates the idea that the 
patient has any responsibility for the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship and the communication that exists in that relation-
ship. It seems the courts' perception of the patient is passive, 
noncontributing, and not responsible is itself a paternalistic and 
demeaning view of the patient. If it is paternalistic of physicians 
to think that they know what is best for the patient, it is equally 
paternalistic of the courts to proclaim patients incapable of and 
not responsible for shaping the discourse between them and their 
doctors. It is this relationship between doctor and patient that is 
the key to true informed consent, and both parties must take 
-
responsibility for their part in that relationship. 
The courts also continue to treat informed consent as an event 
rather than a process. They seem to think that medical decision 
making occurs at a fixed time and place, and that a course of 
treatment, once decided, is an essentially fixed recipe. The 
reality is that clinical decision making is an ongoing process that 
is constantly altered by numerous sources of feedback, includ-
ing the disease and its response to earlier treatment interven-
tions. A better view of informed consent is that it is a process 
between two people who are involved in a relationship with each 
other. 
Burt14 and Appelbaum15 have discussed this view of informed 
consent and present a perspective that it much more relevant and 
meaningful to the actual context within which informed consent 
discussions occur. As they point out, the process of disease and 
death creates fear, anxiety, and/or uncertainty in both doctor and 
patient. As humans, both react to these emotions with attempts 
to control the situation, the doctor through prescribing a treat-
ment and the patient through controlling what will be prescribed. 
Thus what is needed between physician and patient is less 
acquiescence of one to the other, but rather more dialogue, 
discussion, and understanding of the nuances of the 
bio-psycho-social situation in which the two people find them-
selves. In this manner each participant's fears and uncertainties 
can be exposed and confronted. While the ultimate decision 
might or might not be the best or most rational, it will be made 
the way many decisions are made--on the basis of a relationship 
between two people who recognize the humanity of the other. 
Finally, and from a somewhat different perspective, whatever 
is thought of the courts' logic, its current ruling on the role of 
contributory negligence in informed consent cases may in fact 
affect aspects of patient care. By holding that the routine consent 
forms patients often· sign on entering a facility have no legal 
significance in the absence of evidence that the physician 
actually performed his or her duty to disclose risk and alternative 
treatment information, it signifies a need to move away from the 
paper consent documentation via various forms, and instead to 
focus on physician documentation of actual discussions with 
patients.lt should also lead to increased use of interpreters, so as 
to make sure that language limitations don't result in lost 
information. Note that this action would also be consistent with 
Burt and Appelbuam's views of informed consent processes. 
In addition, adherence to both the spirit and letter of the law 
can improve patient care. First, physicians will be required to 
more clearly justify their clinical interventions, rather than to 
rely on the old saw that it's the usual procedure. Instead they 
should be more reflective about their treatment recommenda-
tions and the effect on their patients. This may in tum change 
patient choices. For example, a program at Dartmouth Medical 
School documented that after viewing a video that gave infor-
mation on watchful waiting versus surgery for benign prostatic 
hypertrophy, one-third of the patients who had favored surgery 
changed their minds. 16 Second, because the process of informing 
patients often requires education about diseases, treatments and 
procedures, it is likely that other professionals will become 
involved. With their developing professionalism, nurses and 
pharmacists have increased their teaching activities with pa-
tients. For example, -critical-care nurses 17 and pharmacists are 
becoming more involved in patient education, and thus contrib-
uting to the process of informed consent. 
However, hospitals might negate these gains if they inter-
preted the court's holding on the physician's duty to provide 
informed consent as insulating the hospitals from any liability 
for failure to obtain informed consent. It would be ironic indeed 
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if, in attempting to protect patient autonomy, the court's holding 
negatively affected this move toward increased patient au-
tonomy by allowing hospitals to decrease non physician patient 
education activities. 
In the past hospitals generally have not been held liable by 
courts in informed consent cases. 17-21 However, recently there 
has been the suggestion that medical malpractice, including 
informed consent torts, should be viewed as enterprise liability. 
Under this theory, hospitals would become liable for the torts of 
the physicians on their medical staffs, and physicians would not 
need malpractice insurance for their hospital-based activities. 
Given the increasingly accepted view of a health care team and 
moves toward integrated delivery systems, it would be quite 
reasonable for the legal (and medical) system to focus on 
institutional liability and prevention. 
The best vehicle for identifying and dealing with such 
incidents is the organization in which the doctor practices. 
The memory of the institution can serve to record and piece 
together patterns in a host of apparently idiosyncratic inci-
dents. The collective wisdom of the hospital team can be 
pooled to devise feasible procedures and technologies for 
guarding against the ever-present risk of occasional human 
failure by even the best doctors ... Not only does the organi-
zation have a greater capacity to establish such quality 
assurance programs, but is also more likely to be influenced 
to do so by the incentives created by tort liability.22 
The third potential benefit associated with the imposed duty to 
inform patients of risks and alternatives was alluded to previ-
ously. Providing additional information may result in a decrease 
in unnecessary health care expenditures. As noted previously, 
the provision of additional information 
resulted in an increase in the number of 
patients choosing the less expensive 
medical treatment option. 
The hidden dangers in excessive in-
formed consent procedures are at least 
twofold. First is that out of defensive-
ness physicians and hospitals might ex-
pend precious physician and other per-
sonnel resources trying to achieve a level 
of informed consent that is attainable 
only in the world of law review articles 
each patient's individuality. 
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